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‘When I Look I Am Seen, So I Exist to Change’: Supplementing 
Honneth’s Recognition Model for Social Work 
1 Abstract 
The subject of identity continues to attract widespread interest and debate in the social 
sciences. The nature of who we are, our potential to be different, and our similarity with 
others, underpins many present-day social issues. This paper contributes to this debate by 
examining critically the work of Axel Honneth on optimal identity-formation. Although 
broadly supporting Honneth’s chief construct of inter-personal recognition, a gap in his 
thinking is highlighted and addressed through proffering a fourth dimension to his 
tripartite model. This additional dimension requires demonstrations of recognition that 
instil hope in the face of hardship and empower positive transformations in identity. The 
implications of this reworked model for social work are then considered in terms of a 
range of approaches that can be utilised to build flourishing identities characterised by 
self-esteem, self-confidence, self-respect and self-belief. 
2 Key Words: identity, recognition, change, social work intervention 
3 Introduction 
The interconnection between identity-formation and the attainment of well-being is 
receiving increasing attention by the social work academy (Thomas & Holland, 2010; 
McMurray et al, 2011; Hingley-Jones, 2012). This focus is to be welcomed as the 
construct of identity has sometimes been addressed by social workers in a perfunctory 
way (McMurray et al, 2011).  Yet, it is axiomatic that identity conditions our perceptions 
of self, others and the social world in an irrepressible and foundational manner. Desired 
attributes, such as self-respect, self-confidence, self-efficacy and self-esteem, are 
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predicated on a flourishing identity, reflecting inner congruence. This article contributes 
to this theme by reviewing critically the work of Axel Honneth on the importance of acts 
of recognition in self-realisation (2005). Importantly, it builds on the author’s earlier 
attempts to utilise Honneth’s thinking to develop social work practice. Thus, I have 
previously applied his tri-partite model to the conceptualisation and implementation of 
family support ( ); the social pathology of individualism within western societies and how 
it manifested in the theme of personalisation in social welfare ( ); and the disabling 
emotion of shame following acts of misrecognition and how critical social work might 
respond to build pride in service users ( ).  
  
In this theoretical work, I have accepted Honneth’s three conceptual categories of ‘love’, 
‘rights’ and ‘esteem’ at face value, viewing them as sufficient precursors for optimal 
identity-formation and conflict transformation. However, this article marks a departure 
from this earlier corpus of work by critically questioning the adequacy of these premises. 
Specifically, I argue that a fourth dimension of recognition, not addressed by Honneth, 
needs to supplement his model to make it more fully apposite for understanding the 
psychology and politics of optimal identity-formation. Consequently, this theory-building 
move goes beyond the expository focus of the previous body of work by applying 
critique in order to re-work Honneth’s social psychology.  
 
Following this theory-building step, the implications for social work practice are set out 
addressing how the enhanced model overturns processes of instrumentalism in 
contemporary social life and social work which reify the service user, misrecognising her 
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unique identity. In making this move, I argue social (in)justice is fundamentally played 
out through social interaction whether in the intimate domain of the ‘face-to-face’ or in 
institutional arenas. Social work, it is contended, needs to reinvigorate both the 
‘psychology of identity-formation’ and also the ‘politics of recognition’, and retain them 
as master concepts underpinning the social work process of assessment, goal-setting, 
intervention and evaluation. 
 
4 Honneth’s Theory of Identity 
The theorisation of human identity continues to attract widespread interest in the social 
sciences with contributions on the subject emanating from, inter alia, cultural studies 
(Hall, 2003), sociology, (Elias, 2000), social psychology (Tuffin, 2005) and 
psychoanalytical theory (Benjamin, 1988; Winnicott, 1999). Within these diverse 
theoretical outpourings, it is possible to identify a number of themes including the idea 
that identity is ‘sutured’ within language and discourse (Foucault, 1980; Lacan, 2005); or 
that it emerges from early object-relations with significant others (Klein, 1997); or 
unfolds within the context of concrete, socio-historical circumstances (Bourdieu, 2003).  
 
.  Within this corpus of work there is a compendium of sociological (Rorty, 1980; Taylor, 
1994; Fraser, 1995; Honneth, 2005) and social work literature (Froggett, 2004; Webb, 
2010; Turney, 2012) acknowledging the link between identity-formation and inter-
subjective recognition. These texts support the contention that the self is a social product 
born out of day-to-day social interaction. Importantly, they suggest we are first and 
foremost social beings seeking human intimacy and closeness. Heidegger captured this 
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notion so ineluctably in his magnum opus, Being and Time (2005), saying we exist to 
ourselves in the sense of already being in a social world that is shared with others.  His 
stance presented a powerful challenge to the Cartesian philosophy of consciousness 
(Descartes, 1990) which viewed identity-formation as an intra-psychic process enacted 
by a self-sustaining, unitary subject. While Cartesians promoted a dualistic model 
separating the ‘self’ from the social and material world, recognition theorists, in the spirit 
of Heidegger, emphasised the primacy of inter-subjective relations in forming the ‘social 
self’.  
 
In this section, I outline and critically appraise the work of Axel Honneth (2005; 2010), a 
leading proponent of the ‘recognition theoretic’, and contributor to new left thinking. For 
Honneth, ‘recognition’ of the ‘other’ is the axial principle around which the ‘politics of 
identity’ and social justice turns. Moreover, he contends it has become the leitmotif of 
our time and one that constitutes the inestimable, overarching, moral category guiding 
theory-building and praxis in social justice.  
 
These are bold, inexorable claims that deserve to be taken seriously because they centre 
on privately held and publicly identified injustices. Honneth’s concern, here, was the 
alleviation of everyday misery in the form of humiliation, disrespect, social deprivation, 
unemployment, social isolation, poverty, the obsolescence of rural communities and 
social exclusion. In all these types of suffering a normative principle had been violated; 
that is, there had been a misrecognition of the human subject’s feelings at a primal, 
anthropological level. 
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Honneth addressed these themes by synthesising  Hegel’s (1979) ideas on the nature of 
the social self, and Mead’s (1967) postulations on social development, to construct a 
systematic, social theory of recognition. He was animated by Hegel’s argument that one’s 
relationship to oneself was not a solitary experience held in the private theatre of the 
mind but rather a matter of reciprocity. Mead’s theorisation of perspective-taking 
complemented this axiom. This was the process whereby social actors imagined, through 
an inner conversation, how others might be reacting to them. In doing so, perspective-
taking internalised social norms and shaped social behaviour. Mead also postulated how 
social change was possible by referring to the component of the self known as the ‘I’: the 
creative, virtuosic force of human agency that dialogued with the social ‘me’ (that is, 
society internalised in the person – its rules and prohibitions) to arrive at decisions and 
initiate change.  
 
To reiterate, Honneth’s intention was to build on the philosophical and observational 
hypotheses coming out of Hegel and Mead’s work, to search for empirical and historical 
support for the cardinal idea that human identity was irrefutably intertwined with 
everyday recognition. Moreover, he argued that struggles for recognition were the 
impetus for social change and social justice particularly when experiences of disrespect 
could be located in a common, emancipatory discourse. So, unlike Hobbes (1973) and 
Machiavelli (1961), who propounded the atomistic view that social change emanated 
from narcissistic self-preservation, Honneth argued that claims for rightful identity were 
the driving force behind societal transformations.  
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With these philosophical premises in place, Honneth constructed the centrepiece of his 
emancipatory project. It suggested that three ‘spheres of recognition’ were required to lay 
the foundation for a positive ‘relation-to-self’, namely: (a) receiving love, care and 
positive regard (b) having one’s rights respected in the widest sense possible and (c) 
appreciating and valuing a person’s skills and contribution to the community. Disrespect, 
according to Honneth, was synonymous with the denial of one or more of these three 
spheres of interactional validation. Moreover, misrecognition provided the justificatory 
impetus for struggle, contest and social change. What made conflict a moral enterprise, 
opined Honneth, were the feelings of outrage – shame, humiliation, hurt - emanating 
from episodes of misrecognition. In this way the moral grammar of outrage confirmed the 
normative ideal of a just society. Table 1 sets out Honneth’s ideas in diagrammatic form.  
Table 1 – Honneth’s three forms of recognition 
 
Forms of 
recognition 
Primary 
relationships of 
love  
Legal relations 
involving rights 
Community 
relations that value 
strengths and build 
solidarity 
Dimension of 
personality 
Needs and emotions  Moral standing Worth 
Mode of 
recognition 
Emotional care Showing respect Appreciating a 
person’s strengths 
and contribution to 
the community 
Developmental 
potential 
Security and 
resilience 
Empowerment Competence 
Practical relation-
to-self 
Self-confidence Self-respect Self-esteem 
Forms of disrespect Abuse  Denial of rights and 
exclusion 
Denigration and 
insult 
Threatened 
component of self 
Physical and 
emotional integrity 
Social Integrity Dignity 
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Let us examine each of these three forms of recognition in greater depth. 
(1) Primary relationships of love and positive regard 
According to Honneth, the first dimension of recognition was rooted in early human 
development but continued throughout the life cycle. When a young infant’s primary 
emotional needs for a secure base were met, she developed a relaxed, confident identity. 
From this base, she could explore her world, master various skills and return to this 
protective haven when an emotional threat arose.  
 
Honneth turned to the British, object-relations theorist, David Winnicott (1999) to gain 
theoretical support for his thesis. In particular, he adopted Winnicott’s contention that the 
developing infant was subject to two primary impulses: to individuate, on the one hand, 
and to forge a symbiotic union with the mother, on the other. The key challenge for the 
infant, according to Winnicott, was to successfully emerge from the symbiosis with her 
mother in order to become an independent, confident self – but a self that had 
nevertheless retained a deep sense of its indelible union with her. Basic self-confidence 
emerged if these developmental challenges were successfully met. By way of contrast, 
unloving responses (for example, acts of child abuse) could threaten the infant’s physical 
and emotional integrity. One’s sense of self-confidence, or lack of it, might continue into 
adulthood affecting the quality of trust forged with others. 
 
(2) Legal relations involving rights 
For Honneth, the human subject must receive respect from others in addition to acts of 
love and care. Recognition through respect denoted the bestowal of human rights. This 
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was to view the person as an end sui generis and not a means to an end, to paraphrase 
Kant’s famous categorical dictum (1964). Possessing rights, we feel a sense of equality, 
empowerment and citizenship.  
 
From an historical perspective, Honneth suggested rights, in traditional societies, were 
based on labour relations and positions within occupational hierarchies; in post-
traditional societies, however, they had become universalized and derived from the 
recipients’ rational assent. Over time, rights had come to reflect Marshall’s (1950) classic 
typology endowing citizens with civil, political and social welfare entitlements but only 
as a result of struggle and contestation when rights had been denied and integrity 
threatened. Honneth was keen to interpret the typology in the widest possible sense so 
that the citizen was entitled to live a life free from the effects of misogyny, sectarianism, 
racial prejudice and material inequities. By embracing this latter dimension, he was 
stressing the importance of re-distributive policies in politics. Moreover, contra Nozick 
(1974) and pro-Rawls (2003), this was re-distribution by political decree as opposed to 
the individual’s consent. 
 
(3) Community of value and solidarity 
The third and final form of recognition took a communitarian turn (Putnam, 2000). Here, 
Honneth adopted Hegel and Mead’s view that identity-formation – and the feeling of 
being unique within the social group - arose from a community recognising a person’s 
attributes, strengths and traits. In adopting this stance, Honneth was basically saying self-
esteem arose when actors achieved culturally defined goals and subsequently had their 
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accomplishments recognised. Such goals differed according to time and place. For 
example, pre-modern, hierarchical societies favoured honour as an attribute whereas post-
traditional societies prised individual prestige or standing. Moreover, in the latter context, 
cultural interpretations of achievement and esteemed attributes were open to dissension.  
 
A central plank of Honneth’s argument, here, was that social groups or social movements 
attempted, ‘by means of symbolic force and with reference to general goals, to raise the 
value of the abilities associated with their way of life’ (p. 127). Defining what was to be 
esteemed or otherwise, from a cultural perspective, was the piston in the engine 
propelling the ‘politics of difference’ in modern social life. Yet, in all of this, Honneth 
saw the possibility of value –consensus, of solidarity amongst social groups as to what 
counted as a laudable characteristic or contribution to the community.  Solidarity arose as 
part of a ‘felt concern’ for the other’s value. However, the converse – where insult and 
denigration featured– led to an impairment of the self, to a feeling one’s dignity had been 
transgressed.  
 
5 Reviewing Honneth’s Contribution 
By way of comment, what is appealing about Honneth’s programme is its philosophical 
and political comprehensiveness and inclusivity. That is, there is a firm communitarian 
strand (in the idea personal attributes are socially affirmed); there is a libertarian strand 
(in the appeal to a wide body of inviolable, Rawlsian-type rights); there is a neo-Kantian 
strand (in the sensitivity to abstract moral agency); and there is a psycho-social strand 
(enacted through the lens of intimate object-relations).  In other words, Honneth 
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approached the subject of recognition by synthesising a range of perspectives – 
sociological, psychological and philosophical. This integration is convincing in that 
empirical and historical evidence is presented for his claims. Moreover, by embracing the 
domains of the ‘self’, inter-subjectivity and culture, he took account of the delicate 
interplay between ‘human agency’ and wider social forces – a theme which has exercised 
the minds of many sociological inquirers (Archer, 1996; Bourdieu, 2003; Douglas, 2003).  
 
In all of this Honneth re-energises critical social theory and moral philosophy while 
breaking with the turn to critical linguistics popularised by Habermas (1986), his long 
time mentor. According to Honneth, social justice stems not just from egalitarian 
procedures of communication, as in Habermas’ ‘discourse ethics’; rather, it is sourced by 
the fecund nature of inter-subjectivity, its immanent possibilities for moral feelings and 
appreciation of the ‘other’. Norms are not merely the outcome of unrestricted 
communication; they occur in the context of respected feelings, identities and cultural 
patterns. The corollary to this is that norms are breached through acts of misrecognition 
and disrespect.  
 
There are some acute differences of emphasis, though, between Honneth’s approach and 
that of other leading ‘identity-recognition’ theorists. Taylor (1994), although sharing a 
common base with Honneth in viewing recognition as a master construct, neglects, for 
the most part, class and distributive justice. His focus is mainly on the politics of multi-
cultural identity embracing equality and difference as conjoint themes. As a consequence, 
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Taylor gives insufficient attention to the real and substantive effects of economic 
inequalities, and how they impact on recognition struggles. 
 
Adopting a different cultural lens, Franz Fanon had located recognition struggles within a 
neo-colonial context rather than the Eurocentric paradigm undergirding Honneth’s 
empirical and theoretical work. In his pioneering study, The Wretched of the Earth 
(1965), Fanon investigated the recognition struggles of ‘colonised’ peoples as they 
attempted to reclaim their unique identities through de-colonizing counter-narratives 
against the backdrop of white, hegemonic, universalist and univocal conceptions of 
culture and civilization. There was a moral imperative, here, to recognize the dignity of 
all, irrespective of their racial or cultural affiliations. Putting this another way, the moral 
consideration of the ‘other’ became, for Fanon, the quintessential hub around which 
decolonisation processes turned.   
 
What made Fanon’s approach distinctive, was his unique application of an Africanized, 
phenomenological understanding of the psycho-dynamics of race-bound misrecognition 
and its impact on the ‘self’. This was not only an analysis of the inner experience of 
imposed racial identities on subaltern, black populations, but also of how the self might 
reclaim esteem and cultural pride. This phenomenological understanding of 
misrecognition, through language and cultural conditioning, was discernibly different to 
Honneth’s revivification of the Frankfurt School’s appropriation of critical social theory 
to counter perceived social pathologies in modern western societies. More specifically, 
Fanon’s starting point was misrecognition in grounded, concrete cultural experience as 
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opposed to conceptualising it, first and foremost, from an essentially anthropocentric, 
Hegelian, philosophical position.   
 
Clearly Taylor and Fanon made different uses of the recognition-theoretic compared to 
Honneth. However, a most prominent conceptual tussle has been played out in the debate 
between Fraser and Honneth (1995). For the former, a bivalent theory was required to 
explain injustice in the domains of culture and economy rather than applying a 
comprehensive, monistic theory of recognition to both, as Honneth had done. In reality, 
though, Fraser conceded that most forms of social subordination involved both kinds of 
oppression and were practically intertwined. Tellingly, Fraser insisted that the 
redistribution of material and economic resources throughout society could not be 
reduced merely to struggles over cultural recognition. As such, it was claimed that 
Honneth’s recognition theory was deficient when it came to causal explanations of 
economic inequality and, following this, was therefore not able to adroitly guide 
emancipatory praxis. 
 
Honneth’s rejoinder to these charges, argued that the dynamics of capitalist markets, and 
the economic injustices to which they led, arose from deeply institutionalised and 
embedded relations of recognition.  A superimposing recognition order(s) would 
consequently have a formative influence on society’s economic distribution. There is 
some evidence for this counter-claim. Hence, cultural ascriptions shaping attitudes to 
gender, ethnicity, familial roles, life-course ambitions, and occupational tasks (such as 
house and care work) can have a formative impact on reproducing the division of labour, 
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levels of financial reward and inequalities. In this context, the normative consensus that 
accepts remuneration for work outside the home, yet blithely endorses the ‘second shift’ 
of unpaid domestic work within the home, is a misrecognition anomaly. 
 
Moreover, changes in the superstructure’s normative, cultural and legal orders around the 
membership of unions, the power they held, the attenuation of their legal rights, 
prohibitions on strike action, and the deregulation of employer responsibilities, led blue 
collar workers to experience an ambient fear of expendability in the face of economic 
hardship. In a different vein, cultural stereotypes (propagated invidiously through a range 
of media outlets) of sections of the working class in Britain, portraying them as ‘benefits 
scroungers’, ‘chavs’ and ‘cheats’, have led to populist demands to curb welfare 
allowances.  
 
That said, it is surely asinine to argue that recognitional practices fully determine all 
economic outcomes in each and every instance. Given the ‘revolving door’ between 
economic and political elites, operating at the highest levels of the neo-liberal state 
(Klein, 2007), and their involvement in globalised flows of capital and multi-national 
corporations, there are macro-economic processes beyond the cultural sphere that 
determine distributional wealth. Unemployment may not be due solely to a recognition 
order gone awry, but linked as well with world-wide macro events involving labour 
saving technologies, fluctuating interest rates, banking scandals and so on. Taking all of 
this into account, we can conclude from the Fraser-Honneth debate that, while the former 
downplays the significance of recognition for economic distribution, the latter at times 
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overestimates its potential as a capacious construct explaining all forms of injustice, 
particularly ones linked to economic outcomes. 
 
In the social work literature, Garrett (2010) and Webb (2010) were less convinced about 
the relevance of Honneth’s recognition theory for social work, and more supportive of 
Fraser, although Webb saw some merit in the way it connected socio-cultural and socio-
economic aspects of injustice. For Garrett, though, Honneth’s theory led to a 
psychologisation of human problems and, in its wake, a blame culture that stigmatised 
the oppressed. More significantly, it failed to acknowledge the role of the neo-liberal 
state in promulgating social and economic cleavages (a charge also levied at Fraser). As 
such, the state was curiously a ‘lost object of critical analysis, critique and comment’ (p. 
1527). This was despite the fact that it played a central role in fomenting inequality and 
directly structuring differences between individuals and social groups. Garrett’s point 
was prescient. Furthermore, even though Honneth did consider the role of the state in his 
most recent work on the nature of freedom in society (2014), it was cast in positive terms 
as the social foundation of democratic life. Evidently, the state was a work-in-progress; 
an institution, along with the family and civil society, that enabled citizens to find their 
social freedoms through shared projects. The scourge of the neo-liberal state was not 
something that explicitly registered perhaps because Honneth embraced an Hegelian view 
of it as a guarantor of freedom.       
 
In contrast to these critical responses, a number of social work theorists have commented 
positively on the significance of Honneth’s work for social work.  Froggett (2004), for 
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instance, charts how the use of artistic mediums in social work - such as story-telling, 
poetry and drama - can build a rich symbolic life within service users and contribute to 
their overall wellbeing. She links this creative process with Honneth’s tripartite model of 
identity-formation arguing that art connects people, enabling an essential validation of 
their creative faculties and a sense of social appreciation. Importantly, for this theorist, 
social work as a form of art and recognition, counters the turn to technocracy which 
bedevils social work in many quarters. In a run-away run which privileges scientism in 
social life, to the detriment of the arts and humanities, Froggett’s arguments have much 
purchase. 
 
Turney (2012), in a different vein, finds Honneth’s emphasis on the alliteration of 
‘recognition’, ‘respect’ and ‘reciprocity’, as integral to relationship-based social work 
practice. More specifically, she makes the case that recognition theory provides an ethical 
platform for working with involuntary service users, particularly in situations where 
children are at risk of harm. Turney’s argument has credence as parents value social work 
responses which show care, acknowledge rights and evince strengths (Turnell & Essex, 
2006). An involuntary response may well be a reaction to a threatened identity: one that 
has most likely experienced various types of disrespect and misrecognition in the past. 
 
In a complementary move, Jull (2009) embraces Honneth’s recognition theory as a 
normative ideal for analysing institutional practices in social work.  The notion of 
recognition, here, stands as a counterbalance to embedded, pernicious forms of judgement 
which lead to labelling and stigma.  Judgement, it is argued, can be a form of disrespect 
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or misrecognition which has ramifications for the self because it can often be infused 
with hegemonic, power-saturated discourses. The impact of the new public management, 
neoliberal individualism and an administrative take on social welfare, combine into a 
toxic brew militating against the recognition ideal. Institutions must be founded, it is 
argued, on respect and social appreciation in order to foster empowerment, independence 
and participation (Thomas, 2012).   
 
These positive applications aside, one should not conclude, however, that Honneth’s 
monistic theory of recognition is conceptually complete. His tripartite distinction between 
the different forms of recognition is perhaps deficient in one crucial aspect: it neglects the 
subject’s capacity to change herself and her perception of the world when this important 
attribute is recognised. The nature of existence is to face hardship and suffering. Yet, 
through others, we gain hope and encouragement (as two related forms of recognition) to 
construct personal meaning in the most adverse conditions (Frankl, 2004). Honneth’s 
neglect of this existential capacity is somewhat ironic in that he accedes to Mead’s view 
regarding the creative part of the personality known as the ‘I’. To repeat: to recognise 
another’s potential to change or transform his outlook (on self and others) against the 
backdrop of immense adversity, is a fundamental part of existence. So, I have added a 
fourth dimension to Honneth’s model embracing this additional form of recognition (see 
Table 2 below): 
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Table 2 – A Fourth Dimension of Recognition: Facilitative Relations of Change 
 
Forms of 
recognition 
Primary  
relations of 
love 
Legal relations 
involving rights 
Community 
relations that 
value strengths 
and build 
solidarity 
Facilitative 
relations 
encouraging 
personal 
change  
Dimensions of 
personality 
Needs and 
emotions 
Moral standing Worth Cognition and 
emotion 
Mode of 
recognition 
Demonstrating 
emotional care 
Showing 
respect 
Appreciating a 
person’s 
strengths and 
contribution to 
a community  
Instilling hope 
and belief in 
one’s  capacity 
to change 
oneself 
Developmental 
potential 
Security and 
resilience 
Empowerment  Competence Optimism and 
internal locus 
of control 
Practical 
relation-to-self 
 Self-
confidence 
Self-respect Self-esteem Self-belief and 
self-efficacy  
Forms of 
disrespect 
Abuse Denial of rights Denigration and 
insult 
Reinforcing  
learned 
helplessness 
Threatened 
component of 
self 
Physical and 
emotional 
integrity 
Social Integrity Dignity Human agency 
 
 
To recognize another’s capacity for change and transformation is to recognize the ‘self’ is 
in a constant state of flow, that it is multiplex, context-dependent and discontinuous. The 
identity of the ‘I’ now is different from the ‘I’ of a moment ago in the sense that the 
current ‘I’ has subsumed a moment’s more relational experience (Bergson, 1912).  
 
Recognizing the self as a work-in-progress with transformative potential, rather than a 
static object, has much intellectual support. Developmental psychologists (Blasi, 1988; 
Deci & Ryan, 1991) have stressed the ‘self’s’ capacity for assimilation and adaptation to 
the social environment as have contemporary neuroscientists (Baggini, 2011). Critical 
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readings of Giddens (2004), Beck (2004) and Castells (2000) show their attempts to 
sketch a theory of the modern, reflexive self – a self that is fluid or liquid (Bauman, 
2000) and able to re-construct itself without the shackles of religion and tradition; a self 
that is no longer painting by numbers, as it were, but master of its own portrait.   
 
We also see a challenge to the traditional view of the self as a fixed entity in the work of 
a number of post-structuralists (Lyotard, 1979; Foucault, 1984; Lacan, 2005). In this 
genre, the ‘self’ is transparent, in a state of flux, discontinuous and decentred. With no 
universal or timeless truths in postmodern landscapes, everything is relative, 
indeterminate and open to contention including the defining boundaries of identity itself. 
This latter theme is taken up by narrative therapists (for example, White & Epston, 1990). 
They argue the non-essentialised self can transcend the destabilizing hold of negative or 
‘thin’ narratives through discovering the richer (or ‘thick’) narratives that emerge from 
varying descriptions of experience. Prosaically put, personal freedom is synonymous with 
what we do with what has been done to us. The self has the capacity to move beyond its 
own limiting, internal censorships. 
 
This insight resonates with Sartre’s proclamation that ‘the defining feature of the 
imagination lies in the ability of the human mind to imagine what is not the case’ (Thody 
& Read, 1990, p. 29). This is an act of expanded cognition aimed at enhancing 
competence and self-efficacy. However, this requires both a narrator and facilitator of 
personalised meaning. What is being addressed here, is the human subject’s capacity, 
through discursive relations with others, to alter course in existential terms, to change 
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disabling narratives that have arisen from episodes of denigration. It is not that we ‘have’ 
a self with essentialist, fixed qualities; instead, we ‘do’ a self in the sense the self is a 
social accomplishment. People can deploy, negotiate and achieve new descriptions of 
themselves and resist essentialist category descriptions imposed on them by others. 
Essentially, though, they achieve this capacity through social interaction where 
recognition of this capacity is to the fore. When nurtured, this capacity can lead to an 
internal ‘locus of control’; that is, the perception the self is in control of its destiny.   
 
The achievement of a fuller realisation of the possibilities inherent within the ‘self’ is the 
intended outcome of this form of recognition and is fundamental to the helping task 
(Parton & O’Byrne, 2000). The nature of existential therapy pivots on this fundamental 
premise. For instance, Daseinanalysis (Cooper, 2003) assists the individual to examine 
the full terrain of her world including those areas that had previously been occluded. In 
denying the subject the right to explore this terrain – perhaps through enforced passivity – 
we are denying the creative aspects in human personality. 
 
These additional ideas concerning the ‘self’ and its need for recognition in this particular 
context, are not inimical to Honneth’s programme but rather augment it in the sense they 
are rooted in Mead’s theorisation of identity. Here is what Ritzer (2000) says concerning 
Mead’s formulation of the ‘I’ which was referred to earlier: 
 
‘The ‘I’ gives Mead’s theoretical system some much-needed dynamism and creativity. 
Without it, Mead’s actors would be totally dominated by external and inner controls. With 
it, Mead is able to deal with the changes brought about not only by the great figures in 
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history (for example, Einstein) but also by individuals on a day-to-day basis. It is the ‘I’ that 
makes these changes possible…’ (p. 345) 
 
‘the ‘I’ constitutes something that we all seek – the realisation of the self. It is the ‘I’ that 
permits us to develop a ‘definite personality’. (p. 345) (My emphasis). 
 
Yet, a critical question might be raised at this point: is not this added form of recognition 
just another aspect of recognition through love: in which case why create it as a separate 
category? In response to this question, my contention is that acts of love are primarily 
directed to the expression of intense feelings of warmth. Similarly, friendship cements the 
bond of mutal affection. This is how Honneth shapes his first column particularly when 
he refers, at length, to the intense bond of affection between the mother and her child at 
the early stage of dependence. Such states of being are not concentrated fundamentally on 
the change process which may involve challenge or respectful confrontation, potentiating 
the listener to reflect on her circumstances. Moreover, the sense of self-confidence that 
ideally emerges from the experience of ‘recognition as love’ is not necessarily 
synonymous with the attainment of self-belief that emantes from ‘recognition as 
facilitating change’. I can have self-confidence with regards to a presenting challenge but 
remain blasé as to whether I will succeed or not in achieving a particluar set of outcomes. 
Self-belief differs from this in the sense that I not only willingly engage in the activity but 
am sure I can carry it off to meet the outcomes I desire.    
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6 Implications for Social Work 
Table 2 can be used as a counterfactual tool in social work practice. This is because it sets 
out the requirements for ideal, optimal identity-formation regardless of temporal or 
spatial contexts. It is therefore universalistic in its scope. The purpose of a counterfactual 
tool is to set out the ‘ideal’ and measure reality against it in order to highlight deficiencies 
or to show where requirements have been met or partially realised. It can also be used to 
imagine what might have occurred, from a retrospective stance – as a matter of reflective 
learning.  Some important observations arise when the tool is applied to social work. 
 
First, it invites the question as to whether social work is attending to identity-formation  
as a founding principle of practice? This question rhetorically foregrounds identity as a 
master concept in social work – one at the heart of the social work encounter. This is a 
vital presupposition because modern social work has become imbued with what 
Habermas (1986) referred to as the voice of the ‘system’: the role of the State in shaping 
social welfare services utilising a technocratic modus operandi. The ‘system’s’ 
imperatives result in a raft of policy and procedure, corporate models of regulation and 
social care governance, tick-box forms of assessment, the categorisation of human 
behaviours through the ubiquitous pro-forma and in social work’s electronic turn 
(Garrett, 2005).  Identity seems to be occluded in all of this and not even on the social 
radar in many sites where street-level, turbo-bureaucracy is in the ascendancy and a new 
public sector business model colonises many organisational cultures (Froggett, 2004). 
The routinisation of practice in this ‘brave new world’ has emasculated professional 
discretion (Munro, 2011).  
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Moreover, there is an increasing turn in risk assessment towards actuarial models listing 
objective risk factors for consideration as opposed to appraising the meaning of risk, 
phenomenologically speaking, for the service users under scrutiny; in other words, what 
risk means for them in terms of how they view themselves, others and their social worlds. 
Such processes of objectification and reification are compounded by the 
McDonaldisation of social welfare (Ritzer, 2010), the propensity for developing tools of 
surveillance of marginalised populations, the rise of the preventive-regulative social State 
(Parton, 2006), and the increasing trend towards commodification in neo-liberal nations.  
In this miasma, the ‘psycho-social’ sphere has been eclipsed by an instrumental mind-set.  
 
In adult services, the latest ‘hot’ policy of personalisation (Gardiner, 2011) does not 
necessarily refer to the personalisation of human narrative but rather devolving the 
purchase of services to the service user, beneficial as this may be.  What is more, case 
management is sometimes reduced to the eligibility determination for cash assistance, 
rather than an understanding of the self in situ. Even for children in State care, where 
broken psycho-biographies are to the fore, the lack of serious attention to the theorisation 
of identity-formation in research, policy and practice is telling (McMurray et al, 2011). 
Identity might be glibly referred to but not always comprehensively understood nor 
addressed therapeutically. In this sense, the tool presents a challenge for those individuals 
who occupy leadership roles in developing human welfare services. Services need to be 
reviewed in the context of the provision of inter-subjective relationships to those in need. 
This is to reinstate the social model in social work, to see relationship-based practice as 
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axiomatic (Turney, 2010) and to ‘increase the life chances and opportunities of 
people...by building on their strengths, expertise and experience to maximise their 
capacities (Gray and Webb, 2012, p. 3). 
 
Second, even when identity is overtly considered in social work practice, we might use 
the tool to examine exactly how this area is approached. The three dimensions of love, 
rights and strengths Honneth elucidated, and the fourth recognising the capacity for 
change (which the author added), are all areas that need to be assessed as they are integral 
to optimal identity-formation. To focus on only one area is to miss the holistic nature of 
identity. In social work assessment, information should be widely gathered, facts and 
feelings surmised and analysed, and a formulation reached on areas such as need, risk and 
the resources required. I suggest the tool might be used in this process to highlight what 
aspects of identity formation have been missed or misappraised in the assessment. Who, 
for example, are the significant others providing a child with love and care, respecting his 
rights, acknowledging his strengths and developing an inner locus of control? Such 
questions are vital in the assessment of parenting capacity which should not be reduced to 
acts of physical care nor just the provision of material resources to support the child’s 
development. In addition, they are helpful in determining whether thresholds of 
significant harm have been met in potential serious cases of child abuse. In this context, 
emotional abuse continues to be viewed as a ‘slippery’ domain in the courts and 
elsewhere; maybe this is because, in part, social workers are not confident in their 
theoretical understanding of identity, its component parts and the impact of sustained 
disrespect on the child’s sense of self. Relating this contention to the tool, Honneth does 
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attribute much of his thinking to object-relations theory and the nature of the evolving 
emotional world of the child and its imbrication with close inter-subjective relations. 
Hence, this is to reaffirm we must understand identity-formation as both an intra-psychic 
and inter-personal process. Object-relations theory identifies the underpinning 
mechanisms influencing personality development over the lifespan as well as defended 
reactions to social work interventions. It has great relevance, therefore, for working with 
‘involuntary service users’. Staying with this example, it is also important to assess who 
in a child’s social ecology recognises her strengths, builds up her self-efficacy, and 
acknowledges her rights as set out in the UN Convention on the Rights of the child. 
Furthermore, it is to ascertain the gaps in the child’s social networks, those people who 
offer consistent recognition in one or more of the four dimensions, or alternatively, who 
misrecognise the child through acts of abuse, disrespect, criticism and the reinforcement 
of learned helplessness. It is to be sensitive to the feelings of shame and outrage which 
follow misrecognition by conveying accurate empathy. 
 
Third, the four dimensions map across to different forms of social work intervention (see 
Table 3 below). 
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Table 3 – Recognition and Forms of Social Work Intervention 
 Primary Relations of 
Love 
Legal  Relations 
Involving Rights 
Community 
Relations that Value 
Strengths Build 
Solidarity 
Facilitative Relations 
Encouraging Personal 
Change 
Forms of 
Social Work 
Intervention 
 Relationship-
based social 
work 
 Social work as 
object-
relations 
 Social work as 
care and 
accurate 
empathy 
 Social work as 
building pride 
 
 Anti-
oppressive 
social work  
 Rights-based 
social work 
 Critical social 
work 
 Political 
social work 
 Multi-cultural 
social work 
 Strengths-
based social 
work 
 Social work 
as 
mentoring 
talents, 
interests and 
skills 
 Community 
social work 
 Social 
Pedagogy 
Social work as:  
 forging a 
therapeutic 
alliance 
 instilling hope 
and optimism 
 enhancing 
self-efficacy 
 social 
constructionist 
social work 
Outcomes for 
Service Users 
Builds self-
confidence 
Builds self-
respect 
Builds self-
esteem 
        Builds self –  
         belief 
 
The contention here is that social work must be an amalgam of all these different 
approaches, applied at different times and places according to the use of professional 
discretion, if we are to ensure service users are helped to acquire an optimal identity. The 
table directs the social worker to outcomes that are not primarily about bureaucratic 
proficiency nor systemic achievements but rather framed according to the nature of the 
self, or in Honneth’s terms, one’s practical relation-to-self. It is how the service user feels 
about him/herself on a day-to-day basis which counts. This is about the inner 
conversations people have within themselves when faced with identities that are ascribed 
(rather self-construed), or where stereotypes and reactions based on essentialist notions 
tarnish the self leading often to stigma and shame. Through relationship-based social 
work, the aim is to enhance a person’s confidence, help her build self-respect, esteem, 
pride and a sense of personal efficacy. Moreover, the table marries the ‘psycho-social’ 
with the ‘cultural’ and ‘political’. The dimensions of ‘care’ and ‘change’ are concerned 
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with the person’s intra-psychic world and close relationships whereas the dimension of 
‘respect’ takes the social worker into the realm of human rights, multi-culturalism and 
capabilities. In Honneth’s view, such rights are to be defined widely and include 
opportunities for material well-being as well as liberal rights to expression of one’s 
views. Here, advocacy plays such a crucial role in ensuring equality of treatment and 
access to resources yet retaining respect for difference.  
 
The dimension of ‘strengths’ directs the social worker to the ecological systems 
surrounding the service user such as schools, work places, community organisations and 
so on. These are the networks that can potentially recognise a person’s unique 
contribution to social life and provide holistic, pedagogical opportunities for growth and 
development. In all of this creating a therapeutic alliance with the service user is of the 
utmost importance as is instilling hope and the expectation change is possible. These 
attributes of the helping process are at least as important as the chosen therapeutic model 
in realising effective outcomes. In a related vein, building self-efficacy comes through the 
application of cognitive-behavioural methods, positive reinforcement, mentoring, and 
providing opportunities for experimenting with new skills where opportunities exist for 
learning through observation. To summarise, Table 3 promotes a counter-factual 
comparison between actual practice and each of the dimensions of recognition and their 
corresponding social work interventions – noting to what extent social work takes 
seriously the ‘psychology of identity-formation’ and the ‘politics of recognition’. 
 
  27 
Practically, though, it may be very difficult to make a linear extrapolation of recognition 
theory to these different forms of social work practice. Social workers often need to adapt 
and transfer theoretical ideas between different settings, temporal periods, cultures and 
specialist domains of working. Pure theoretical models reflect generalised prescriptions 
that often need to be modified through the application of common sense, intuition, 
practice wisdom and artistry.  The use of self and one’s emotional awareness are also 
involved in transferring theory into action. Bearing in mind the afore-mentioned points, 
critical reflection is one significant way of connecting recognition theory with different 
forms of social work intervention, and complements the application of the counterfactual 
analysis previously described.  
 
Critical reflection involves examining and debunking taken-granted views about people 
and the social world in order to enhance practice (Fook and Gardiner, 2010). One way of 
starting the process, is to consider a critical incident involving the perceived 
misrecognition of service users. This is an event that is significant or important in the 
sense that it has potentially impeded optimal identity-formation or denied human rights in 
some fundamental way. Through supervision, social workers can be encouraged to 
describe the incident in full, so that awareness of important and relevant aspects of the 
‘self’ and ‘situation’ are covered. Table 2, outlined above, can be used here to reflect on 
what type of misrecognition occurred, its impact, who was involved, the setting and time 
period and what social work intervention, as detailed in Table 3, was applied to address it 
.  
  28 
Building on this initial step, the social worker is then helped to analyse the facts and 
feelings arising from the incident, any experiences of shame and challenge any 
underlying assumptions or decisions to adopt particular practice responses. Why were 
certain models of intervention used and not others? How were they structured? Did the 
social worker consider the structural constraints impacting on the service users and use 
Honneth’s model to cast light on them?   
 
Such analysis of the incident, and response to it, then leads to an evaluative stage of 
reflection that applies judgement, insight, and synthesis to the presenting issues. Were the 
social worker’s goals of intervention essentially met or not met? Did the reflection throw 
light onto relevant issues, and wider contexts such as the structural constraints affecting 
human lives? What were the strengths, weaknesses and gaps in the practice response? To 
what extent were the four columns of recognition addressed? On the basis of this 
evaluation, social workers can finally reflect on their learning: how they can enhance 
recognition-led social work intervention. Part of this process of learning, is to reflect on 
the application of abstract recognition theory to practical, grounded ethical dilemmas and 
complex scenarios involving risk and complex need.  
 
7 Conclusion  
What is truly marvellous about the human subject is his or her capacity to change and 
adapt in the face of challenge and threat. This is an ineluctable aspect of our evolutionary 
ontology for, when we look into the eyes of the ‘other, we see a reflection of ourselves. 
Put in another way, ‘when I look I am seen, so I exist to change’. This truism is captured 
  29 
in Cooley’s ‘looking glass mirror’ analogy. Importantly, when the mirror reflects love, 
care and respect, this is likely to have very positive ramifications for the self and its 
developmental potential. However, social workers must ensure vulnerable service users 
do not see jagged shards of glass – broken images refracting shame, ignominy and 
stigma. Such negative images constitute what Honneth referred to as the ‘abyss of failed 
sociality’ which attenuates the self and its creative capacity. Building on this axiomatic 
postulate, I supplemented Honneth’s tripartite model of optimal identity-formation by 
including a fourth dimension not previously identified: that of recognising a subject’s 
capacity for self-transformation. This aspect of recognition is as vital for optimal identity-
formation as receiving care, respect and the acknowledgement of one’s strengths. 
Expanding this view of recognition re-emphasises the importance of the psycho-social 
realm in social work and poses a challenge to various facets of bureau-professionalism 
and instrumentalism in modern practice which objectify need. Furthermore, the re-
worked model embraces the politics of recognition, where claims to equality and 
difference are to the fore and social justice is a fundamental feature of social work. 
 
However, the widespread application of recognition in social work must extend to the 
social work profession as well. How can we expect practitioners to recognise service 
users if they are continuously misrecognised in organisational life? The four-fold model 
of recognition espoused in this paper must apply in formal and informal supervision, the 
manner in which social workers are treated in meetings, how their training needs are 
identified and met, and how induction and mentoring are carried out. Boldly put, social 
workers must be recognised through acts of care and respect. Moreover, managers and 
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policy makers should recognise their strengths and be wary about deficit-led cultures of 
blame. They should also nurture the profession’s agency – its capacity to enact 
transformative practice. More than this, the profession must be recognised by wider 
society and its institutions. Hence, the concept of recognition captures something 
essential in human subjectivity whether the focus is on the recipients or providers of 
social work services.      
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